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   1 
EUROPEAN SECURITY TRENDS 
 
 
The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a great theoretical debate about the 
conditions for peace and stability in Europe. Balance of power and alliance theories together 
with realist assumptions have been on trial in the aftermath of the Cold War, especially in 
relation to the continuation and expansion of NATO and the European Union.
1 The possible 
emergence of a European-wide security framework has led to new theoretical and conceptual 
orientations such as constructivism,
2 security communities,
3 and security governance.
4  These 
approaches and concepts are beneficial to the study of European security in a number of ways. 
They help to:  shift the emphasis from a purely rationalistic or objective interest of states to other 
characteristics such as institutions, ideas, culture and identity;
5 move beyond the state–centric 
approach by employing multi-level and multi-actor analysis, e.g. regional and sub-regional 
actors; and broaden the definition of security through the incorporation of non-military aspects.
6 
 
The concept of security governance seems to hold particular promise for studying 
developments in European security. Building on a considerable body of literature on the study of 
governance in domestic, European Union, and international policy making,
7 security governance 
                                                           
1 In 1990, John Mearsheimer called for a new balance of power in Europe and predicted that NATO and the EU 
would fade. See his “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, 15:1 
(1990), 5-56.  A similar view is presented by Kenneth Waltz in “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 
International Security, 15:2 (1993), 44-79. For a general criticism of balance of power and alliance theories see 
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, 24:4, (1999), 5-41. With regard 
to alliance theory  and NATO expansion see Stuart Croft, “Rethinking the Record of NATO Enlargement,” in 
Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe’s 
East (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 26-42. 
2 See Alexander Wendt,  Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: 
Routledge, 1998); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization, 52:4 (1998), 887-917; and Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations 
Theory,”  International Security, 23:1 (1998), 171-200.  
3 See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). For an earlier development of this concept see Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957). 
4 Representative studies include James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); James N. 
Rosenau,  Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999); Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political  Science Review, 95:1 
(2001), 1-13; and Mark Webber, “Security Governance and the ‘Excluded’ States of Central and Eastern Europe,” in  
Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe’s 
East (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 43-67. 
5 For further details see Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
6 See James Sperling, “European Security Governance: New Threats, Institutional Adaptations,” in  James Sperling 
(ed.), Limiting Institutions?  The Challenge of Security Governance in Eurasia, forthcoming. 
7 For a good overview of studies on governance at the sub-national, national and international level  see Elke 
Krahmann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,” Working Paper 36/01 (2001) 
published by the British ESRC “One Europe or Several?” Programme.    2 
employs a broad notion of security, which includes internal (state) conflict, organized crime and 
environmental degradation, and relates to the increasing number and diversity of actors engaged 
in European security. It highlights the inability of states or governments to provide security 
across multiple levels and dimensions by existing unilateral or multilateral institutions, and 
suggests that problems arising from differences in the needs and interests of states and limited 
resources have favoured the increasing differentiation of security policy-making and 
implementation.
8 
 
The study on security governance in Europe has so far witnessed two distinct features. 
Firstly, it has concentrated mostly on the requirements of security governance and the geographic 
parameters (questions of inclusion and exclusion through membership in, for example, NATO 
and the EU). Secondly, there has been a tendency to stress the military aspects of security and 
the (lead) role of NATO in European security.
 9  Less emphasis has been given to the working 
and coordinating mechanism of security governance, the content and implications of the non-
military aspects of security, and the contribution of the EU towards European security.  
 
Undoubtedly, NATO has made great strides in the last ten years in changing its internal 
as well as external image through the adoption of a new military strategy, the transformation 
from collective defence to collective security through, for example, peace making and peace 
keeping activities, and the links with Central and Eastern European states via the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, the Foundation Pacts with Russia and the 
Ukraine, and actual enlargement. But to imply that in security governance NATO fulfils a role 
comparable to that held by the EU in trade, monetary or environmental governance is debatable 
on a number of accounts.  
 
Firstly, in order to play a lead role, or be the main regulatory agency in security matters, 
NATO would have to be seen as capable of dealing either with a substantial number of so-called 
security threats, or with what are perceived to be high ranking security threats. Empirical 
evidence indicates (to be provided below) that the EU is considered to be more relevant than 
NATO with regard to the majority of security threats identified, and deemed equal to NATO 
with regard to the threats identified as having a high probability of occurrence. 
 
Secondly, unlike the EU which has formal regulatory mechanisms such as the “acquis 
communautaire”, and has legal jurisdiction in a number of key policy areas, NATO lacks such 
means. Whereas NATO relies on unanimous decision-making and American-led consensus 
building, the EU employs both majority voting and unanimous decision-making methods, 
depending on whether a particular issue falls within the confines of the “community method” or 
the intergovernmental one. Furthermore, attempts are being made to curtail the practice of 
unanimity in such policy areas as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the 
                                                           
8 Ibid, p.7. 
9 See, for example, the contributions by Mark Webber and Stuart Croft in Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre (eds.), 
New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe: Securing Europe’s East (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002). 
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practices of either “enhanced cooperation” or “constructive abstention”, which would allow a 
number of EU countries to act without requiring the consent of all member states.
10  
 
Thirdly, there is a question about NATO’s readiness to engage in future missions of 
peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making. Concerns have been expressed that future 
NATO engagements, will be circumscribed by U.S. reservations, as was the case in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, due to its protracted unanimous decision-making structure. An enlarged NATO, on the 
one hand, and the incipient membership of Russia in NATO on the other, will exacerbate this 
potential problem further. At the same time the United States presses for NATO interventions 
against international terror and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and to operate “out of 
area”, meaning out of Europe. For their part, the Europeans complain of lack of consultation and 
participation in the formulation of U.S. global strategy. These differences in security threat 
perceptions (causes, and consequences of security threats, and whether NATO’s command 
structure should shift from a geographic to a functional focus) between the United States and 
Europe are likely to grow and will affect NATO’s readiness.
11 Whether and how the 
establishment of a 20,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force, announced at the NATO summit in 
Prague, will mitigate or exacerbate the problem of divergence remains to be seen. 
 
Fourthly, the fact that the EU has so far found it difficult to translate ESDP aims into 
practice, or to mount joint actions with regard to military actions, should not be seen as a 
conclusive judgement of the EU’s ability to play an important role in European security 
governance. The growing ability of the EU to out-do NATO in dealing with Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) states in norm-setting
12 and compliance; in aid and development programmes; 
and in direct participation (after enlargement) over a wide-range of internal (Justice and Home 
Affairs) and external (European Security and Defence)  policies, is likely to enable the EU to 
challenge some of NATO’s security functions, and to erode its presently held pivotal role in the 
establishment of a European-wide security governance. 
 
It is not the task of this paper to speculate on whether the EU will become more 
important than NATO in European security governance. Rather the paper seeks to examine: (1) 
which of the two is deemed most relevant in dealing with certain specific types of threats, and 
whether a division of labour among the leading security institutions is emerging accordingly; and 
(2) whether coordination, especially on issues of military engagement, is becoming easier rather 
than more difficult among the lead security organisations. Underlying these aims is the 
assumption that for European security governance to be effective it needs a sharing and 
coordinating mechanism. As the market cannot be left simply to the “unseen hand” of demand 
                                                           
10  For example, the Amsterdam Treaty mentioned the use of “constructive abstention”, and the Nice Treaty 
officially adopted the principle of “enhanced cooperation” for potential policy areas such as CFSP. 
11 For a more elaborate view on NATO’s future see Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading for 
Divorce?” International Affairs 77:3 (2001), 553-567; F. Heisbourg and R. de Wijk, “Debate: Is the Fundamental 
Nature of the Transatlantic Relationship Changing?” NATO Review, Spring 2001; S. Sloan and P. van Ham, “What 
Future for NATO?” Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, October 2002; Charles Krauthammer, “Re-
Imagining NATO,” Washington Post, May 24, 2002; Jeffrey Gedmin, “The Alliance is Doomed,” Washington Post, 
May 20, 2002. 
12  This involves adherence to the so-called Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire.   4 
and supply, and needs, frameworks and regulations provided either by states or international 
organisations for a proper functioning, a similar argument can be made for security governance. 
 
Proponents of security governance accept the heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting 
nature of interests, but imply that in so far as coordination is necessary, it is perceived to be best 
left to the actors themselves (self-government because of issue specifics). In this line of thought 
actors themselves recognize the need to share their capabilities, e.g. NATO-ESDP, or NATO to 
offer military structures for OSCE and UN missions. However, as Krahmann points out, while 
these arrangements prevent duplication and allow for accumulation of specialist expertise and 
capabilities, they contribute to the fragmentation of security governance in Europe.
13  
 
Whilst recognizing that there is a problem with coordination, as became particularly 
evident in the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis, students of security governance have paid insufficient 
attention so far to this aspect. This paper will explore the aspect of coordination, and the 
application of the concept of security governance to a wider spectrum of security threats than has 
been the case hitherto. This will be done partially through the use of a pilot study of security 
experts in Europe and the United States on their perceptions of security threats (identification of 
types and likelihood of occurrence) and institutional response (degree of institutional suitability 
according to type of threat).  
 
In the following, we will first expand on the concept of European security governance 
and illustrate why it can be deemed a useful tool in the study of European security. We will then 
provide some background of a pilot study on security threats and institutional relevance, and 
complement these with case studies, derived from available literature, on the suitability of the 
EU, NATO and nation states with regard to twelve types of security threats. This will be 
followed by an analysis of how the lead security organizations coordinate their activities within 
the system of European security governance. 
 
Security Threats and Security Governance 
 
Most of the existing approaches on the study of security, including those on international 
regimes and security communities, apply a state-centric approach. This is somewhat surprising 
given that most conflicts in the last ten years have been internal to states rather than states 
against states. As Buzan, et al. point out, the concept of security not only relates to the 
preservation of state boundaries, but also to the protection of societies and individuals within 
states.
14 Accordingly, security for Buzan is the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and their functional integrity.
15 While threats to the territory of states are 
                                                           
 
13 Elke Krahmann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,” p. 16. 
14 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1998).  
15 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).   5 
primarily identified in military terms, societies and individuals face a multitude of dangers 
ranging from the inadequacies of political and social structures, to environmental degradation.
16 
 
The concept of security governance employs a broad notion of security, which includes 
internal conflict, transnational crime and terrorism. It argues that as the scope of security threats 
expands, the tendency of states or governments to withdraw from provision of public services in 
favour of multilateral or public-private policy making (mostly because of cost saving exercises) 
will spread to the security sector. The large number of new bilateral and multilateral security 
institutions that have emerged in Europe since 1990 are seen as evidence of this spread. These 
institutions are seen as capable of resolving conflicts and of facilitating cooperation.
17  Both 
individually and collectively they are systems of rule through which state and non-state actors 
can organize their common or competing interests in individual, national, regional and global 
security. Membership and relations among these systems of rule are complex and overlapping, 
and so are their functions and obligations.
18 In contrast to government, governance does not 
(substantially) depend on central authority in policy making or rule enforcement. As James 
Rosenau points out, governance is “a system of rule that is as dependent on inter-subjective 
meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters.”
19 
 
Security governance shares characteristics with international regimes and security 
communities. International regimes are defined by Krasner
20 as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.” According to Adler and Barnett,
21 a security 
community consists of “a region of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.” For Adler and Barnett the existence of a security community in Western 
Europe has enabled Europe since 1990 to avoid competitive balancing behaviour.
22  Similarly, 
the fact that CEE states share many cultural, historical and political characteristics with the West, 
according to these authors, is significant in their wish to join NATO and the EU. Like security 
community, security governance espouses a sense of shared understanding. 
 
  The concept of security governance differs from international regimes and security 
communities in that it denotes more fluid and flexible arrangements. It can be regarded as the 
aggregate of a series of overlapping arrangements governing the activities of all, or almost all, 
the members of international society (or a regional subsystem of it) over a range of separate but 
reinforcing issue areas,
23 including such temporary arrangements as the development of the 
                                                           
16 Elke Krahmann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,”’ p. 6. 
17  See Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), p. 15. 
18Elke Krahmann, “The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe,” p. 1. 
19 James Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto 
Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 4. 
20 Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. 
21 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, p. 30. 
22 Ibid, p. 40. 
23  See Mark Webber, “A Tale of a Decade: European Security Governance and Russia,” European Security, 9:2 
(2000), 31-60.   6 
Euro-fighter-aircraft.
24  In line with this conceptualisation, security governance can be defined as 
an intentional system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of states and non-state actors (or at 
least the major actors) that are affected, which through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and 
informal), governs activities across a range of security-related issue areas.
25  
 
  Whilst this definition helps to conceptualise security governance, it provides insufficient 
information about what the regulatory mechanisms are, the types of threats to which they are to 
apply, and which organisation should be primarily responsible for designing regulatory 
mechanisms. Neither does it sufficiently specify the “range of security-related issue areas” or 
provide a rank ordering of these. 
 
  In the following, an effort will be made to shed more light on the types and importance of 
security threats, and the relevance of institutional response. 
 
 
Security Threats and Institutional Relevance 
 
A pilot study, undertaken in 1999,
26 identified twelve conceivable security threats to the 
European security space: a biological/chemical attack; a nuclear attack; the criminalisation of 
economies; narcotics trafficking; ethnic conflict; macroeconomic destabilization; general 
environmental threats; specific environmental threats; cyberwarfare or cybervandalism against 
commercial structures; cyberwarfare against defence structures; terrorism against state 
structures; and migratory pressures.    
 
Ethnic factionalism/irredentism and migratory pressure emerged as the types perceived to 
be most likely to threaten security. They received the highest scores for both 1999 and for 2010. 
Criminalisation of the economies and narcotics trade was second and environmental damage and 
degradation was third. Terrorist activities against commercial and state/defence structures came 
fourth, and biological/chemical/nuclear warfare was fifth.  
 
There is a consensus among the survey respondents that states are more likely to achieve 
their security goals within, rather than outside, multilateral institutions.  NATO and the EU are 
viewed as the primary security institutions and secondary roles are attributed to the UN, 
international financial institutions, the OSCE, and specific multilateral fora such as Interpol.  
                                                           
24 Elke Krahmann, ‘The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe, p. 5. 
25 This is basically a modified version of the definition provided by Mark Webber  in “A Tale of a Decade: 
European Security Governance and Russia,” 31-60. 
26 This study was based on government documents, the academic literature, and the survey data response of forty-
two leading European and North American security experts to an extensive questionnaire. The individuals surveyed 
for this project were security and defence policy experts drawn from academia, research institutions, and political 
foundations. The questionnaire was developed by the author in 1999 for a project on European security financed by 
the European Commission. Three different (and progressive) questionnaires were discussed with 70 security experts 
at meetings in Brussels, London, and Washington, DC in the Spring and Summer of 1999. 
 
   7 
NATO is the clear institution of choice to meet the challenges posed by the threat of biological 
or chemical attack, nuclear attack, and cyberwarfare against defence structures.  The EU is the 
clear institution of choice to meet all other security challenges facing the Atlantic Community.  
National responses to these challenges are largely dismissed as irrelevant. Only in the cases of 
cyberwarfare against defence structures and terrorism are national responses considered useful, 
and even then they are considered only third or fourth best solutions to the problem.  While the 
EU and NATO are clearly seen as the institutions best able to meet these security challenges, 
there is no clear second-best institution to cope with these problems (see Table 1). 
 
Extent of Threat Perception and Institution best prepared to address Threat (1999) 
(N=42) 
Threat  Institutions rank-ordered from 1
st to 4
th 
Type  Ratings* 1st 2nd  3
rd 4
th 
Ethnic conflict  75%  EU (39%)  NATO 
(31%) 
OSCE (19%)  UN (12%) 
Migratory pressures  67%  EU (54%)  OSCE (17%)  NATO (15%)  UN (15%) 
Specific environmental threat  45%  EU (54%)  UN (21%)  OSCE (14%)  NATO (12%) 
Narcotics trafficking  45%  EU (56%)  0SCE (13%)  INTERPOL (13%)  NATO (11%) 
Criminalisation of the economy  44%  EU (70%)  OSCE (15%)  NATO (13%)  UN (2%) 
Macro-economic instability  41%  EU (53%)  IMF (21%)  UN (12%)  NATO (8%) 
Terrorism against the state  37%  EU (43%)  NATO 
(24%) 
OSCE (13%)  National 
(13%) 
Cyber-warfare against state/defence 
structures 
37% NATO 
(45%) 
EU (33%)  National (12%)  OSCE (7%) 
Cyber-warfare against commercial 
structures 
36% EU  (36%) NATO 
(17%) 
UN (17%)  OSCE (11%) 
General environmental threat  22%  EU (48%)  UN (21%)  OSCE (18%)  NATO (8%) 
Nuclear attack  22%  NATO 
(63%) 
UN (18%)  EU (14%)  OSCE (5%) 
Biological/chemical attack  12%  NATO 
(43%) 
EU (27%)  UN (18%)  OSCE (12%) 
          
*Denotes the percentage of respondents rating the type of threat occurring as ‘moderate’, ‘probable’ 
 and ‘high’, as against a rating of ‘low’. 
 
  
As this table shows, there is a strong correlation between high ranking security threats 
and the EU as the foremost institution to respond to these threats. The EU is listed first on the six 
highest ranking security threats; obtaining, for example, a 70 per cent rating on the threat 
emanating from the criminalisation of economies. NATO comes second for one of these six 
types, third for two, and a distant fourth for three of these threats. Other institutions, such as the 
OSCE, the UN, the IMF and Interpol, score higher on some of these threats than NATO. This is 
a reminder that focusing solely either on NATO or NATO plus the EU neglects other important 
institutions which are involved as security providers. However, NATO is seen as the undisputed 
number one institution when it comes to the military issues of nuclear attacks, and biological and 
chemical warfare. The EU is placed second and third on these issues. 
   8 
These findings offer a number of suggestions for the study of security governance. 
Firstly, they reaffirm the need for a broad definition of security threats that includes military as 
well as non-military security aspects. Secondly, they indicate that there is a linkage between 
different types of security threats. In other words, the occurrence of a particular type of threat is 
often linked with the arrival of another or others. Thirdly, they assign a prominent role to the EU 
in terms of response to security threats. Fourthly, they implicitly point to the need for a better 
division of labour and greater coordination and cooperation among the leading security 
organizations: NATO, EU, OSCE and UN. While existing studies on security governance have 
emphasized the first of these four suggestions, insufficient attention has been paid to the other 
three aspects. In the following, these four aspects will be examined more fully, with particular 
emphasis on numbers three and four. 
 
Reference to non-military problems reopens the thorny issue of whether they are a 
security problem per se,
27 or causes of more traditional security problems? Much of the debate 
surrounding this issue relates to an objective definition of security. One way to get around this 
hurdle is to adopt the term of ‘securitisation’.  This signifies a process by which particular issues 
are “taken out of the sphere of every day politics” by specific groups or particular state elites, 
and defined as security problems.
28 In this respect security is not considered as a direct 
consequence stemming from a threat but as the result of the political interpretation of the threat. 
Therefore security is analysed as the reaction of a political action towards an existing or 
perceived threat. Securitisation is thus a merely political process and is different from a threat 
that can be caused by various factors (economic, social, military, etc.). 
 
Whilst there is no satisfactory answer as to whether non-military aspects are security 
problems per se, or causes of more traditional security problems, there is generally agreement 
that the nature of security threats is changing, and that threats since the end of the Cold War have 
become more complex and far-reaching. Instead of facing a single, predominantly military threat 
capable of wiping out the entire nation (and the world), we are faced with a myriad of threats, 
smaller in magnitude and harder to see and counter. This phenomenon was amply demonstrated 
with the terrorist attacks of 11 September: an attack that demonstrated that networked terrorism 
has become de-personalised and de-regionalised; highlighting that the terrorist threat is global 
and cannot be reduced to individual actors. However, there is a link to failed states. “One lesson 
of September 11 is that if failed states are allowed to fester, they can become sanctuaries or even 
agents for terrorist networks, organized criminals and drug traffickers. When states, like 
Afghanistan, fail their neighbours and often the global community are faced with refugee flows, 
ethnic or civil conflict, and political disintegration.”
29 Realisation of the changing security 
environment is not new however. As the NATO Council already noted in 1991, the “Alliance 
security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism 
                                                           
27 D. Baldwin warns that if security is equated with a catch-all concept that embraces all of humanity’s problems, it 
loses a clear analytical focus. D. Baldwin, “The Concept of security,” Review of International Studies, 23 (1997), 
17-18. 
28 K. Krause, “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the ‘Third World’ in the Post-Cold War World,” Review of 
International Studies, 24:1 (1998), 134. 
29 Daniel S. Hamilton, “German-American Relations and the Campaign against Terrorism,” American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 2002, p. 7.   9 
and sabotage.”
30 NATO repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts 
of terrorism” to the top of the list of risks.
31 These shifts of risks weaken the distinctions between 
different kinds of security – national and regional, military and economic, internal and external – 
but indicate a linkage between different types of security threats. As Hall and Fox
32 illustrate, it 
is no longer possible to separate terrorism from money laundering or organized crime from drug 
trafficking. Refugees and asylum seekers not only pose internal security concerns but may 
encourage xenophobia and conflict, as traditional work opportunities appear threatened. At the 
same time, mass movement may bring with it the possibility of infectious diseases affecting both 
people and livestock. Migration is also exacerbated by environmental instability arising from 
climate change.  Weak states often create conditions in which terrorists can flourish. The 
emergence of cyber-terrorism can be considered as constituting a dangerous threat to economic 
and social life in Europe. Most biotechnology research and development is dual-use in nature 
and can potentially be misused by terrorists and ‘rogue states’. Equally, there is a likelihood that 
terrorists will resort to weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore impossible to “wage against 
one to the exclusion of the other.”
33 After September 11 internal security is as important as 
external security. This holds particularly true for the EU with regard to enlargement.   
 
These linkages among security threats require extensive scope in policy response. 
Operating as it does over a wide range of military and civilian policy domains; the EU has a 
manifest advantage over other multilateral organizations and non-state actors. 
 
The EU possesses more numerous and varied instruments of influence than does NATO, 
especially at the level of conflict prevention, and therefore has a comparative advantage over 
NATO for managing potential conflict situations.
34 But how much of the perceived EU 
advantage has been or is likely to be translated into concrete results? Scholars like Christopher 
Hill
35 question the EU’s capacity in the foreign and security field and point to a “capability-gap”. 
However, it should be emphasized that studies highlighting capacity limitations of the EU often 
tend to apply this to a narrowly defined area of CFSP or ESDP, namely the military capacity of 
the EU.
36 This downplays EU capacity unnecessarily, and neglects the importance of the EU to 
combine military and civilian as well as diplomatic, economic, and trade instruments. 
 
It is not the purpose here to review the various attempts the EU has made since 1999 in 
establishing ESDP.
37 Neither is it the case to dwell extensively on both the actual or potential 
                                                           
30 The Alliance New Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991, para. 12. 
31 The Alliance Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, April 23-24, 1999, para. 24. 
32 R. Hall and C. Fox, “Rethinking Security,” NATO Review, Winter 2001, vol. 49, no. 4, p. 8.   
33 Ibid. 
34  See for example, Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” McNair Paper 66, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002, p. 71. 
35 See Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capability Expectations Gap?” in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), A 
Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998). 
36  See for example, Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, Summer 2001. 
37  For a collection of the core documents on the European Union’s common foreign and security policy see Maartje 
Rutten, “From St- Malo to Nice, European Defence Core Documents,” Chaillot Papers, No. 47, published by the 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, May 2001; and Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Laeken: European Defence Core 
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shortcomings of ESDP. Rather the emphasis will be on how the various security institutions or 
their member states have responded or provided solutions to ethnic conflict identified in the 
above empirical study as the most highly rated security threat in terms of probability of 
occurrence. In turn, this will help to identify the areas where cooperation, coordination and a 
division of labour among the major security institutions is most needed or appropriate. 
 
Threats from Ethnic Conflicts and Migratory Pressures (and “Failed States”) 
 
The response by security institutions to the two perceived most pressing security threats can be 
divided along four criteria: peace-enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict 
prevention. Peace-enforcement activities in this context imply military interventions in the 
settlement of an ethnic conflict, involving humanitarian interventions. Peacemaking, as 
understood here, is mostly linked with political and diplomatic and efforts to settle a conflict, 
though it is clear that their efforts can be enhanced if they can be linked with effective military 
capabilities, on the one hand, and appropriate economic (financial assistance) and administrative 
backup (technical assistance), on the other. Peacekeeping refers to the engagement of troops for 
the purpose of “keeping” the agreed peace settlement. Conflict prevention in this context implies 
here the emphasis on financial and technical assistance; economic cooperation in the forms of 
trade or association agreements, or enlargement provisions; nation building and democratisation 
efforts. Obviously, there are overlaps among these four categories, but for analytical reasons they 
will be treated separately. 
 
We will start with considering peace-enforcement or crisis management situations. Much 
of the empirical analysis will concentrate on the CEE countries, which are of central concern to 
European security governance. 
 
Peace Enforcement 
 
This is the area where military capability is most important and where it is traditionally 
recognized that the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe are lacking such capability and 
where the EU has, so far, been unable to mount appropriate capability levels, as was the case in 
the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict.  By contrast, NATO, due to its newly vamped role of out-of-
area engagement, has demonstrated both relevance and effectiveness in dealing with the two 
mentioned conflicts. 
 
Lack of political will, insufficient decision-making capacity, and inadequate acting 
(primarily military) capacity has hitherto prevented appropriate EU action in this field.   
Insufficient political will is reflected in the lack of trust among the major EU states when it 
comes to security and defence considerations or intelligence sharing. This is evidenced in the 
limited remit of ESDP, which is to perform the ‘Petersburg tasks’ -that is, “humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.”
38 
 
                                                           
38 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, “Petersburg Declaration”, para.4 of part II.   11  
The required bodies and decision making structures for ESDP were belatedly established 
(1999-2002), e.g. the High Representative for CFSP, the Policy Unit, the Political and Security 
Committee, the European Union Military Committee, and the European Union Military Staff; all 
regrouped or attached to the Council of Ministers.
39 However, there is still an absence of a 
Council of Defence Ministers, a defence budget, or an agency to buy equipment, and a reliance 
on unanimity voting in decision-making. Unless reforms can be introduced,
40 the latter will 
become more protracted as the EU moves from 15 to 25 members. 
 
EU military capacity is undermined by the existence of: (a) 15 armies, 14 air forces and 
13 navies, all with their command structures, headquarters, logistical organizations, and training 
infrastructures; (b) too high a proportion of immobile ground forces; and (c)
41 problems of 
interoperability between European forces. It is insufficient in advanced information technology, 
air-and sea-lift,
42 air refuelling, and precision-guided munitions.
43  A considerable part of these 
deficiencies relate either to under-spending
44 or uncoordinated military spending, e.g. waste of 
duplication and the inability to take advantage of the economies of scale, especially with regard 
to research and development. Overall, the EU lacks a planning and budgetary system. 
 
Moving towards collective action on peace enforcement also requires a change in mindset 
among some EU members such as the “neutral” countries and Germany. In that respect it was 
encouraging, perhaps even astonishing, that in the Kosovo conflict, not only did Germany 
engage militarily for the first time in the post-second world war history, it did so without the 
legitimacy of a specific UN mandate.  
 
Until December 2002, Turkey had effectively vetoed the RRF by denying it access to 
vital NATO assets (largely U.S. held) unless it received guarantees that the ERRF would never 
be used against its interests. It then won a promise from the EU that Cyprus would not take part 
in ERRF operations.
45 
                                                           
39 The newly created ESDP apparatus was employed for the first time to formulate a common approach and to 
concert diplomacy in the Macedonian crisis of 2001. 
40 Attempts have been made to make use of such methods as “enhanced cooperation” or “constructive abstention”. 
The first was introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the second with the Treaty of Nice. But these attempts 
have so far failed. It will be interesting to see whether the Convention, in its effort to establish a draft for a European 
Constitution is able to advance the application of these concepts.  
41 In December 2002, it was announced that the EU plans to set up a military academy to train troops for the ERRF. 
It will take service personnel from the 15 existing EU states and the ten new candidate countries. Nicholas Rufford, 
“First for Brussels Army,” Sunday Times, December 15, 2002. 
42 For example, the United States has 250 long-range transport planes and the Europeans have eleven. There are 
plans to overcome the gap on strategic airlift by modernizing the fleet with the A400m carrier, but by the beginning 
of 2003 there were still serious problems with financing in some of the participating EU countries. See Judy 
Dempsey, “US-European Capability Gap Grows,” Financial Times, November 20, 2002. 
43 One of the projects where there is cooperation is the Eurofighter project, but states do not pool from it. 
44 Taken all together, the European members of NATO will spend only around $150 billion on defence in 2003, 
compared with some $380 billion by the United States. Whereas the U.S. defence budget represents a 20 percent 
increase over the year 2000, European defence spending has (with the exception of the British) fallen by more than 
25% since 1987. See Saki Dockrill, “Does a Superpower Need an Alliance?,” Internationale Politik, Transatlantic 
Edition, 3/2002, vol. 3, Fall Issue,  p. 5. 
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Generally speaking, NATO has a distinct advantage on peace-enforcement activities over 
the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the UN, and largely over the EU. Peace-enforcement activities 
are simply not part of the remit of the Council of Europe, and if the UN or the OSCE want to 
evoke them they will either call on or delegate authority to NATO to carry out such activities. It 
is likely that in time the EU, through its Rapid Reaction Force, will fulfil a similar function. 
 
Peacemaking (Balkans and Middle East) 
 
In the Macedonian crisis (March 2001) the EU, largely through the brokering of Javier Solana, 
became the primary agent for the West in restoring peace and preventing the spread of armed 
conflict.
46 The campaign was bolstered by the inducement of closer ties with the EU via a 
stabilization and association agreement that held out the prospect of eventual membership for 
Macedonia.
47  In the Middle East, the EU has deliberately kept its role non-political, preferring 
EU trade concessions, investment, technical and humanitarian assistance, and after the 1993 Oslo 
Accords, funding for the Palestinian Authority positions. Through the “Barcelona Process” it has 
also provided a forum for discreet contacts between Israelis and Palestinians during breakdowns 
of their peace process. 
 
Overall, it can be said that there have been some achievements by the UN, EU, and 
OSCE with regard to peacemaking, but these organizations have been outdone by a combination 
of U.S. intervention (Dayton Accord and role in the Kosovo conflict) and NATO, given its 
superior peace-enforcement capability. Again this is not a traditional field of engagement for the 
Council of Europe. 
 
Peacekeeping 
 
Peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, Kososvo and Macedonia were all under NATO command until 
the beginning of 2003. However, the European countries were providing more than 60% of the 
20,000 troops in Bosnia and of the 37,000 in Kosovo (with the United States providing about 20 
and 25% respectively),
48 and all the troops in Macedonia. European forces also provide 3000 to 
5000 soldiers for the International Security Assistance Force that is patrolling Kabul. 
 
An EU police mission (EUPM) took over from the UN (International Police Task Force) 
in Bosnia on January 1, 2003. The objective of EUPM is to train, monitor and assist the Bosnian 
police in law enforcement duties.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
45 For further details on the background of this issue see A. Missiroli, “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis 
Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP,” Security Dialogue, XXXIII:1 (2002), 9-26. 
46 Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” p. 55. 
47 Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” p. 54. 
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In general terms, much of the peacekeeping activities, though heavily made up of 
European forces, have been carried out either under UN jurisdiction or NATO command. The 
EU is starting through EUPM in the civilian sector and the possible replacement of NATO 
command of the Bosnian forces to take on an effective peacekeeping role. 
 
Conflict Prevention (emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe) 
 
The following instruments can be seen as relevant for the purpose of conflict prevention: 
 
a) nation-building efforts in states that have either experienced civil war or need assistance in 
their new found independence. Of almost $15 billion disbursed in development assistance to the 
Balkans between 1993 and 1999, the European countries and the European Union spent $6.9 
billion and $3.3 billion respectively, while the United States contributed only $1.2 billion. The 
EU and the European NATO allies also provided between 1990 and 1999 $20 billion of the 
approximately $35 billion in aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
49 In Serbia and 
Montenegro, the EU has brokered the constitution. 
 
b) market reform efforts, e.g. PHARE and TACIS programmes. These measures also help to 
respond to other identified security threats: macro-economic destabilisation; organised crime. 
Both these programmes have been broadened since their introduction from a focus on the 
conversion to a market economy to include the strengthening of democracy.
50 
 
c) pre-condition efforts for EU membership, including ‘partnership’ agreements. 
 
d) conditions in association agreements (including the Lome Convention), customs unions, and 
trade agreements. All the EU’s associate agreements with third countries contain clauses on 
respect for human rights, political pluralism and standards for good governance.  
 
It can thus be argued that in terms of performance on conflict prevention, NATO makes 
important contributions to peace and stability in Europe. This is evident in, for example, 
disarmament and confidence-building efforts in Europe, e.g. the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, which was signed by NATO; the Partnership for Peace programme; and the 
Euro-Atlantic joint Partnership Council (EAPC). The latter comprises 46 countries. It was 
created by NATO and has sponsored defence, peacekeeping, and civil emergency operations. It 
has also encouraged its members to respect minorities, resolve disputes peacefully, and ensure 
civilian control of their military establishments.
51 However, despite these efforts, and those of 
other security institutions, the EU can be deemed to be the most important institution in the field 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
48 Julian Lindley-French, “Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma 
Post-11 September,” Chaillot Papers, no. 52, Institute for Security Studies, May 2002, p. 10. 
49 Ibid., p. 10. 
50 Iris Kempe and W. von Meurs, “The EU’s New Ostpolitik,” Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition, 3/2002, 
volume 3, Fall Issue, p. 96 
51  See Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002, vol. 
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of conflict prevention. It has a wide scope of jurisdiction, can grant economic benefits, is able to 
set norms and standards (e.g. through enlargement), and can combine economic (trade and 
financial assistance), diplomatic and increasingly military tools in the external field. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There can be little doubt that the Iraqi war has left the Europeans deeply divided over how the 
world is to be managed in the future. The St Malo pioneering spirit has been lost in the throes of 
post war Iraq. The new mix of strategic cultures will de facto tilt the balance in the direction of 
Atlanticism and a reluctance to allow the Union to assume its responsibilities. To counteract this 
trend, the EU must rise to the dual challenge of enlargement and security. According to Nicole 
Gnesotto, unless it does so successfully, it risks a cleavage, which in the foreseeable future could 
be accompanied by the worst possible form of Europe: a large free trade area that is envied but 
not protected, rich but vulnerable to all the uncertainties of globalisation, with here and there 
some instances of political cooperation and depending on the country, nurturing two illusions: on 
the one hand that of traditional transatlantic security and on the other the illusion of renewed 
importance of national cards in world affairs.
52  
 
For Gnesotto four priorities should be pursued:
53 
 
1.  Political priorities have to be re-established. ESDP has made great progress over 
the last four years, but needs a common view on the crises in which it is to be 
used. In other words, what the EU has to look at seriously is foreign policy rather 
than military arrangements or capabilities. 
 
2.   A readiness to look at the world as it is: one lesson of the Iraq crisis is the urgent 
need to find a common mechanism for sharing information and analyses on 
threats that could affect the interests and security of Europe as a whole. Common 
analysis of the risks is of course no guarantee that there will be consensus on the 
policies to be adopted, but it is a prior condition for adoption of any individual or 
collective position taken by states. There is a need to mesh better CFSP/ESDP 
with the national security and defence systems. 
 
3.    Set engagement priorities: should it be the Balkans, Iran, North Korea – and 
above all the fight against proliferation in general?  We need to identify the 
priorities not only in their own right, but also to identify possible policy 
divergences from US policy and therefore risks of fresh European divisions. 
 
4.  There must be discussion, among Europeans, of America. Not to condemn or, on 
the contrary, to adopt a priori U.S. positions, but to look together at the profound 
changes that have taken place in that most powerful country in the world. 
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What then does the future of EU security policy entail? Joseph Nye makes a telling 
observation when he states that the EU is not likely soon to become the military equal of the 
United States, or for that matter a superpower, but it has enough sticks and carrots to produce 
significant hard power; the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. In 
addition, despite internal division, Europe’s culture, values and the success of the EU have 
produced a good deal of soft power, the ability to attract rather than merely coerce others.
54 The 
EU’s most important geographic area of engagement in security and defence terms will for some 
time remain Europe (eastern Europe, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, possibly North 
Africa), and its main activities will continue to be conflict prevention and peacekeeping. To 
undertake more tasks of an international crisis management (peacemaking and peace 
enforcement) would probably require the establishment of a legitimate executive with authority 
to commit the peoples of Europe to war, or even to a clear line on subjects like Iraq of action or 
inaction.  
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